11.5 Complex systems theory: why large states continued in the Near East

The evidence for the growth of cities, and the limitations to that growth, along with the social change that occurred, can be explained using concepts from complex systems theory (N. Johnson 2009; J. H. Holland 2014). This theory can be useful to explain how cultural and social institutions changed as settlement and urban structures transformed. Complexity is not separate from the process of universalism described earlier. Rather, universalism, a process that explains the emergence of commonalities and that feedback into emergent systems, can be seen as a case of complexity. Complex systems can be understood as being composed of multiple actors and sub-groups that interact and that affect change and emergent behaviour and systems in a non-linear manner. The change is not proportional to the input provided by any actor or group; even simple interactions among actors at micro-levels, as in the case of migration, can lead to complex social outcomes, in a similar manner to what Bedau (2008) calls ‘weak emergence’. For some universal concepts, such as common language or religion, population migration may initially have some limited effects, such as minor linguistic change, including shared words. However, as changes occur at some social levels, the combination of multiple changes may begin to affect other levels of society. When levels of migration are high or significantly intense, major institutional changes, including those that relate to governments, languages and religions, can emerge whereby those institutions begin to develop fundamentally different ideas that reflect social diversity.

What complex systems theory can help explain is how, as people interact through closer proximity, changes in larger social structures become evident. Bottom-up influences through small, personal interactions lead to larger, institutional changes. Such changes can occur at different timescales, but population infusion from different social groups, if its level is sufficiently high, is likely to lead to more pronounced institutional changes that cause traits to be shared by different cultural groups. These complex systems are also adaptive and can learn; they are ‘complex adaptive systems’. In these systems, influxes of new social groups can influence how subsequent social, institutional changes occur. We saw this in cases such as the Hellenistic evolution of the satrapy system, in which new elements were added, and adapted, to a new social setting even though the system was learned from the previous style of government. Systems that create large states adapt and change to meet evolving conditions, often building on previous experiences and events that shaped the wider Near East. Many of the later empires adopted earlier methods of governing, modifying them, but not radically, as they learned from previous events. When universal religions became established there were more substantial social changes, but even in this field the change was gradual, and the polytheistic identities of populations changed only slowly – over centuries – across the Near East.

The continuity of large states and empires was not easily reversed, as populations, social change caused by movement, and concentrations of wealth made the Near East amenable to heterogeneous populations and to government by a single entity over vast distances. The political effect of universalism in the Near East was to facilitate the perpetuation of large states after the collapse of one state or empire. Institutions created incentives for populations to intermix and even to depend on each other, as in trade and military affairs. With fewer but larger significant centres, a smaller number of cities needed to be overcome than in the pre-AoE to gain political control over wider territory. Large areas of the Near East, such as the Jazira and the Khabur Triangle, had low-density settlements, while other regions, such as the Levant, grew into socially linked, important trade destinations that led to greater co-dependence between surrounding settlements. This made it far easier for larger territories to be associated politically. Socio-cultural changes, which led cultures to live closely together and to share many traits, became part of the social fabric over many generations as populations adapted to and learned from each other. Above, it was shown that governments had begun to facilitate and even enhance the multi-ethnic makeup of their states. This is another adaptive trait that was probably an outcome of increased population intermixing and encouraged even more migration. Common languages provided ways in which people could benefit more in a diverse society than if they were living in isolated communities. The rise of universal faiths created social bonds that went beyond ethnic identities. The emergence and continuity of universal concepts (e.g. religions) and large imperial administrations shows that institutions had adapted to the diverse populations within cities and across large states. Perhaps more importantly, those populations themselves adapted to the idea of one large state in which changes in the dynasty or state that governed did not lead to a re-emergence of the fragmented states common in the pre-AoE. The concept of ‘King of Kings’, or a ruler over many nations, became politically more palatable. Worshipping one’s gods, speaking one’s language and interacting with others from the same cultural background did not have to mean living in one’s original homeland. After common social traits had begun to be established, empires and states had developed strategies for governing multi-ethnic and diverse states, and long-distance economic interdependencies had become the norm, few, but very large, urban areas arose, and universalism became a pattern not easily reversed.

The pattern of long-lived empires and large states represents a relative steady state or equilibrium which established itself after major changes caused by population movement. A part of complexity theory is the concept of dynamic equilibrium (Ramsey 2003: 87), in which a steady state emerges even during disruptions and changes that may, periodically, alter the wider system of larger states. Empires and large states are generally maintained, as the social systems within are quite resilient. Changes can happen over long historical cycles, in which a steady state emerges after a long period, but they can also occur quickly. In Near East empires, disruptions would reflect change, but the system was resilient, and regularly bounced back to its steadier state of large states throughout the AoE.

The equilibrium of empires and large states that occurred in the Near East was dynamic: political and social changes often occurred; new ideas and population groups were further integrated, along with new political powers, but larger states as a political reality in the Near East remained. Goldstone and Haldon (2009: 26) have indicated this for the wider Near East, as empires became the political norm. The political, social and wider economic systems that were created became self-perpetuating to the degree that, over time, which power was in charge did not matter. Change in the political order was continual, but states of similar size or sometimes even larger managed to emerge. Disruptions proved to be short-lived, as social and economic links now stretched across much wider regions, which enabled states to incorporate much wider territory. The incentives and structures that helped create larger states, including the spread of populations, wealth and trade, became too well established to be easily reversed. Larger states became something that populations got accustomed to; they became accepted by everyone from the lower social classes to the higher political elites, and the social bonds between the governed and the governing reflect an adaptation to more diverse populations.

During the pre-AoE there was a dynamic equilibrium, but that equilibrium point, during many periods within the pre-AoE, was of small or city-state entities, with the notable exception of Egypt, which was often unified. Empires emerged in the pre-AoE, but they did not remain stable for long periods. Settlement structures did not change substantially over many periods within the pre-AoE, during which patterns of material culture, trade, governance, language and religion do not suggest the population intermixing evident in the AoE. Not only was the emergent system in the AoE resilient, but also continued population movement reinforced an established pattern, which made large states and imperial systems the norm even during inevitable political change.