1.3 1914

The real test of Danish neutrality came in 1914. Towards the end of July, when a great-power conflict seemed imminent, the Radical Liberal government consulted the leaders of the other parties, and found they all agreed that the only possible policy for Denmark would be a strict and impartial neutrality. When war broke out, early in August, the government issued a series of declarations of neutrality, relating to the several great-power conflicts. However, a number of contacts with German authorities had already indicated the nature of Danish neutrality. As early as 30 July a message from Berlin requested ‘a favourable neutrality’, to which the foreign minister Erik Scavenius replied ‘yes of course – to the extent that this can be reconciled with the concept of neutrality itself’.⁶ On 2 August, before Britain had entered the war, the German minister in Copenhagen asked the foreign minister how Denmark would react to a possible violation of its territorial waters. After intense discussions with the king and representatives of the armed forces, Scavenius presented his answer the following day. The government hoped, he said, that such a violation would not take place. If, through no fault of Germany’s, it nevertheless did, that would make no difference to the position of neutrality assumed by Denmark. ‘In no case,’ he asserted, ‘would Denmark ally itself with the enemy of Germany.’⁷ Thus the government made its position quite clear. Whoever might violate its neutrality, Denmark would not go to war. It followed not only that the country in no circumstances would be the enemy of Germany but also that it could never become its ally.

On 5 August, after Britain had entered the war, the German minister enquired whether Denmark intended immediately and effectively to close the Great Belt, one of the straits providing access to the Baltic Sea. As the German navy had already started mining the area south of that passage, decision-makers in Copenhagen were inclined to regard the enquiry more as a demand. A refusal, they thought, would be likely to lead the Germans to complete the mining by themselves, in the process perhaps occupying a couple of strategic points in Denmark. All of them anxious to avoid any kind of involvement in the war, most were inclined to accept the demand. But when the parliamentary opposition showed reluctance to support such a decision, the government changed its mind. At this stage the king, encouraged by the chief of the navy who believed in accommodating the Germans, intervened to make the government reverse its decision again. The German minister was given an affirmative answer, and the mines were laid. To assuage the British government, the king, apparently under the impression that the mines would not be charged, sent a message of explanation to his British counterpart. George V was very understanding, as was the British minister in Copenhagen. At this stage of the war Britain had no real intention of entering the Baltic. But now Danish neutrality, in contrast with earlier wars between great powers, rested on closed straits.

The war itself provided further examples of Danish willingness to adjust to German needs. In the autumn of 1914 the government, concerned about the possibility of the war moving into the Baltic, which might lead Germany to occupy some Danish territory, made an attempt to mediate between the various belligerents. When it became clear that there was no way of bringing about a general peace, the Germans encouraged the Danes to explore the possibility of a separate peace between Germany and Russia. Although such a peace could not be in the interest of the Western powers, Denmark maintained its mediating efforts till the summer of 1915, all the time, however, discreetly keeping Britain informed. In 1917, when the intensified naval warfare enhanced the strategic importance of southern Norway and Germany feared a British action in that area, the prospect of a German occupation of Danish territory arose again. To forestall it, the foreign minister offered to put certain Danish islands at the disposal of Germany if the need arose, and once again assured the Germans of his government’s intention to resist any British violation of Danish neutrality. However, while the political leaders broadly accepted the need to pursue a policy of pro-German neutrality, the sympathy of the king (personally quite critical of Germany), the army, the press and the people was overwhelmingly on the side of Germany’s enemies. With Britain in particular there were many unofficial contacts throughout the war, the flow of military and political intelligence to London from highly placed Danish sources being especially important.

The bias towards Germany did not stop Denmark from championing the rights of neutrals and exploiting the advantages of non-belligerents. In its former efforts, Denmark collaborated with the other Scandinavian countries, mainly through consultation and coordination of attempts. In the first few years of the war the Scandinavian countries, and other small European neutrals, repeatedly approached the United States with a view to gaining American protection for the rights of neutrals. The minimal response of the Americans did not make it any easier for weak European neutrals to resist the diplomatic pressure of belligerent great powers and maintain a strict and impartial neutrality.

In drawing on the economic advantages of non-belligerent states, Denmark was rather more successful. Though highly dependent for its foreign trade on both Britain and Germany, it had considerable bargaining power over each, which it used with remarkable skill. Its negotiators could argue that unless Denmark kept up its exports to Britain, it would not be able to receive the raw materials needed to maintain the supply of agricultural products to Germany. Thus they convinced the Germans that it was not in their interests to continue the embargo on Danish exports to Britain that had been imposed at the outset of the war. Britain, on the other hand, wanted Danish exports enough to accept that an increasing share went to Germany. Within Denmark, the pattern of foreign trade that emerged was of particular benefit to the agricultural interests. But the shipping section, too, benefited from the war, even though a very large part of the merchant navy was requisitioned by the allied powers and many ships were lost.

Notwithstanding the various concessions to Germany, Denmark remained a neutral state. Whereas the Conservative Estrup in 1878 and the Liberal I.C. Christensen in 1907 had envisaged an alliance with Germany as a possibility in an extreme situation, the Radical Liberal leaders of 1914–18 did not go beyond a fairly passive and guarded compliance with German requirements in specific matters and never really considered engaging in the war. Though the government carried out a partial mobilization at the beginning of the war and repeatedly expressed its intention to resist a British violation of Danish neutrality, the Radical Liberal lack of faith in military resources qualified its determination to defend its position with physical means. The anti-militarism of the governing party, which was shared by many Social Democrats, pointed to the security and defence policy that would take its final form in the following decades.

So did another characteristic of Danish neutrality in the First World War, namely a suggestion of intellectual and moral superiority. As upheld by the Radical Liberal leaders, the policy reflected an inner confidence that the principle of non-involvement in the violent struggles of great powers was in harmony with the intellectual and moral forces that they, in common with a growing number of Social Democrats, believed would be shaping international relations in the twentieth century.

After the end of the war most Danes regarded the policy of neutrality as having been successful. It had kept the country out of war and given it substantial economic advantages, and had done the same for Sweden and Norway. The Radical Liberal government, which remained in office till 1920, now wanted to obtain some lasting protection for the international status of neutral states. Following an abortive revival of the old ideas of neutralization and arbitration, its representatives, together with those of the other Scandinavian nations, concentrated their efforts on influencing the drafting of what became known as the Covenant of a League of Nations projected by the victorious allies. Danish attention focused on the plans for a system of collective security, in particular on article 16 of the draft Covenant, which set out the obligations of members of the proposed League in dealing with a state in breach of the Covenant. The main concern of the government was that a member might find itself automatically obliged to participate in military sanctions. However, it received assurances that, while participation in economic sanctions would be obligatory, in the application of military sanctions the duties of members would not go beyond granting right of passage to those engaged in imposing them.

Early in 1920 the parliament unanimously approved Danish membership of the League of Nations. Yet the new Liberal government continued the endeavours to ease the role of small states in the new organization, and did achieve a few concessions regarding the obligations to participate in economic sanctions and to grant right of passage. Three of the four parts of the programme for maintaining peace among nations laid down in the Covenant, namely peaceful settlement of disputes, disarmament and peaceful change, were in harmony with most Danish thinking about international relations. But the principle of solidarity against aggression and war, on which the fourth part, collective security, rested, remained difficult to accept for large sections of a nation which for more than a hundred years had stayed out of alliances and escaped involvement in major wars.